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BANKRUPTCY RULES, MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT,
AND FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL

Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker

Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific
Human Capital
Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker**

Bankruptcy rules often enable equityholders to obtain value even
though debtholders are not paid in full. This paper addresses the
ex ante effects of violations of absolute priority. These violations
should influence decisions concerning project choice and human
capital investment that determine the extent to which a firm’s
managers have an advantage over others in operating the firm’s
assets. In an absolute priority regime, managers will “entrench”
themselves by overinvestment in assets that require their unique
skills. Managers will also underinvest in firm-specific human
capital. Allowing ex post violations of absolute priority decreases
the severity of these two problems.

Introduction
Bankruptcy rules—and especially the rules governing corporate
reorganizations—often enable the equityholders of an insolvent company
to obtain some value even though the debtholders are not paid in full.
Given the minimal requirements for invoking the protection of the
Bankruptcy Code, one way in which the equityholders can extract value is
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by putting (or threatening to put) the firm into Chapter 11. In Chapter 11,
equityholders have the power to prevent or delay confirmation of a plan
of reorganization. The procedural rights and powers conferred on
equityholders by the Bankruptcy Code—such as the automatic stay1 and
the exclusive period2—should enable equityholders to extract value from
debtholders.3 Although the out-of-bankruptcy priority structure—very
roughly, secured debt before unsecured debt before equity—is respected
in bankruptcy de jure, we can expect that it will be violated de facto.
And it in fact is. The available empirical evidence demonstrates that
“absolute priority” is routinely violated. The extent of the deviations from
absolute priority may vary from study to study, but their direction is
clear.4 The existence of these deviations have led to proposals calling for a
substantial overhaul of the current Chapter 11 in the hope of restoring an
absolute priority regime.5 Yet, the question arises whether the observed
violations of absolute priority are indeed undesirable. Because these ex
post deviations are by now largely anticipated, they may well be reflected
in the terms under which credit is extended, and thus may not
compromise the interests of the creditors. Clearly, to determine whether
these deviations are undesirable, it is necessary to identify their ex ante
effects—that is, to analyze how parties alter their behavior ex ante in light
of the ex post anticipated deviations. Some work has recently pursued this
line.6
In this article, we seek to contribute to this inquiry by analyzing an ex
ante effect that has not thus far been considered in the literature: the way
violations from absolute priority may influence the degree of managerspecificity that the assets of the firm may have. By manager-specificity, we
1

11 U.S.C. § 362.
11 U.S.C. § 1121.
3 For a detailed analysis of the factors that enable shareholders to extract value, see
Bergman and Callen (1991), Baird and Picker (1991) and Bebchuk and Chang (1992).
4 See Francks and Torous (1989), Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt (1990), LoPucki and
Whitford (1990) and Weiss (1990). This work is summarized and extended in White
(1992b).
5 Baird (1986), (1992) and Jackson (1986, p.218-24) suggest replacing Chapter 11 with
auctions; Bebchuk (1988) suggests that participants in a reorganization receive certain
options that would ensure absolute priority. See also Bradley and Rosenzweig (1991) and
Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992), which build on Bebchuk (1988).
6 See Adler (1992), Bebchuk (1991), Daigle and Maloney (1990), Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991), Gertner and Picker (1992), Harris and Raviv (1992), Picker (1992) and White
(1992a). None of these papers, however, has considered the type of ex ante effects on
which we focus here.
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mean the degree to which the assets of the firm require certain skills
unique to the firm’s current managers. These skills allow the managers to
employ the assets more effectively than other managers could. Managerspecificity, in turn, will be determined by the initial choice of the firm’s
assets and also by the manager’s decision to invest in human capital. For
given managerial human capital, some projects will make better use of
that capital than others. Similarly, for a given project, investment in
specific human capital would increase the advantage of the existing managers over others in operating the assets. Each decision—selection of the
firm’s projects and selection of managerial human capital—influences the
extent of manager-specificity of assets. And these decisions, in turn, may
be influenced by the degree to which absolute priority is respected, so
long as investment decisions are not fully contractible.
To examine the effects of ex post extraction on these two ex ante
decisions, we contrast two legal regimes. In the first, which we will label
the absolute priority regime, priority is respected: Equity receives value
only after creditors are paid in full. In contrast, in our second regime,
which we label the extraction regime, we assume that equity has the
power to extract a given fraction of the value available for distribution,
even if that violates absolute priority. Our extraction regime corresponds
most naturally with the current Chapter 11, as deviations from priority are
associated with it. Our absolute priority regime might track the
Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 7 if it stood alone or those reforms of Chapter
11 that would ensure absolute priority.
To facilitate our analysis, we assume that there is a single equityholdermanager. Accordingly, we will use the term manager and equityholder
interchangeably. Our assumption is obviously most appropriate for
closely-held companies. Fortunately—for both the relevance of our
analysis and perhaps for the overall health of the economy—bankruptcy
cases involving public corporations are exceedingly rare.7 More generally,
even large cases—say, cases involving more than ∂100 million in assets—
make up less than 2% of the cases in which Chapter 11 plans are
confirmed. (See Flynn (1989).) And this overstates the presence of large
cases, as the probability of confirmation appears to be positively
correlated with asset size. (See Flynn (1989).) Bankruptcy cases involving
closely-held companies are therefore of substantial importance, and our
model should match those cases quite closely. In our concluding section,
7

Bradley and Rosenzwieg (1992) put the figure at well-under 1% both before and after
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.
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Section IV, we suggest reasons why the type of effects that we identify in
our model may also be present in the case of publicly-traded companies.
To summarize our results, our analysis suggests that the extraction
regime is superior to the absolute priority regime in the ways that it
influences manager-specificity of assets. First, with respect to initial project
choice, the extraction regime reduces the inefficient bias in favor of specific
projects that is present in the absolute priority regime. Second, with
respect to investment in firm-specific human capital, the extraction regime
encourages such investments and moves them closer to the efficient level.
We find it easiest to discuss these effects separately. Accordingly,
Section II focuses on initial project choice in a model of managerial
entrenchment. Managers can choose among different projects. Some of the
projects are more valuable with the current managers than they would be
with outsiders (we call these “specific projects”), other projects can be
managed equally well by outsiders (“general projects”). If project choice
cannot be contracted, managers will seek to entrench their positions by
choosing specific projects. Nonetheless, the failure regime directly
influences the extent to which managers will seek to entrench themselves.
The key point to note is that even with absolute priority, it is hard to
keep equityholders from sharing in the value of the project. If the general
project is chosen, under absolute priority, equityholders get nothing if the
project fails. If the specific project is chosen, though, they will get a
fraction of the value attributable to their specific skills. The former
equityholder will strike a deal with the new owners of the project and will
thereby share in the project’s value. The consequences of this for ex ante
project choice should be clear. If the general and the specific projects have
the same upside potential, equityholders will clearly prefer the specific
project. In fact, the equityholders will be willing to sacrifice a general
project with a higher expected value than the specific project has to ensure
that they get a share of the value if the project fails.
Under the extraction regime, these same effects are at work, but they
are tempered. The equityholder gets a fraction of the value of a failing
project not only when the specific project is chosen but also when the
general project is chosen. The extent to which the equityholders benefit by
selecting the specific project is decreased. As a result, even though
decisionmaking under the extraction regime still falls short of a first-best
solution, it is an improvement over the absolute priority regime. To put
the point differently, equityholders can entrench their positions by
choosing projects that match their given skills. This phenomenon is
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generally recognized in healthy companies8 but it also matters a great deal
for the choice of the failure regime. Equityholders will choose projects
with an eye to weakening their competition for the project if it fails. This
entrenchment strategy produces a distorted preference for specific
projects. Because the extraction regime allows the managers to share
always in the value of a failing project, it moves the manager’s project
choice closer to that required for efficiency.
In Section III, we switch to considering investment in human capital by
a manager. The firm has a given project for which it needs debt financing.
The returns to the project depend directly on whether the manager invests
in human capital. We will assume that such an investment increases the
expected return. Whether the manager will invest depends, of course, on
how the benefits and burdens of investment are borne. We will assume
that the manager bears the full cost of such investments, or equivalently,
that reimbursement for investment is not contractible. Given this, whether
the manager will invest depends on how the manager shares in the
increment as compared to the realized cost of investment. If the firm fails,
the price paid for the firm will reflect, in part, whether the manager
invested in human capital. If the manager did invest, a prospective earner
will pay more than it would otherwise as it knows that it can garner some
fraction of the extra value that will be realized when the old manager is
rehired.
How this plays out depends on the applicable legal regime. In the
absolute priority regime, the manager is limited to whatever share of the
increment it can obtain in ex post negotiations with the firm’s new owners.
In the extraction regime, the manager gets that amount, plus it shares
another fraction of the increment received by the creditors from the higher
purchase price. Again, while in both regimes, investment will fall short of
the first-best level, the extraction regime leads to higher overall welfare
than the absolute priority regime. Thus, in both the entrenchment model
and the human capital model, neither regime is able to achieve the firstbest outcome, but the deviation from absolute priority that defines our extraction regime leads to more efficient investment.
8

See Shleifer and Vishny (1989); see also Edlin and Stiglitz (199[2]).
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I. Managerial Entrenchment
A. Framework of Analysis
In this section, we present the model of managerial entrenchment. The
equity of the firm is owned by a single equityholder-manager, an
entrepreneur we will call E. This avoids problems of conflict between
managers and equityholders.9 The firm has a project that requires debt
financing of D. We assume D is given exogenously and that the amount of
debt financing required is given by a wealth constraint on E. We abstract
from the state verification issues that might justify the form of the debt
contract (see Gale and Hellwig (1985)) and instead assume that the debt
contract takes on the standard form. The debt may be raised from any
number of lenders.
E has a certain “unique” skills, which we will take in this section as
given. (Section II will consider the issue of E’s investment in human
capital.) E’s human capital is more critical for some projects than for
others. As a result, as will be seen, E’s choice of project may produce an
effect of “entrenchment.”
The sequence of events in the model is as follows. At T = 0, the firm
borrows an amount D > 0. At T = 1, an investment project is chosen.
Finally, at T = 2, the debt becomes due, and the firm’s value is divided
between E, as equityholder, and the debtholders. Our assumptions about
each of the model’s elements are described below. Let i denote the interest
rate set at T = 0 for the period between the raising and payment of debt;
that is, at T = 2 the firm will owe its debtholders the amount of D(1 + i). Let
i0 denote the corresponding risk-free interest rate. We assume for
simplicity that all participants are risk-neutral and that the lending market
is competitive. Accordingly, the firm will have to offer an interest rate i
such that the expected payment to the debtholders is D(1 + i0).
At T = 1, the firm will choose between two investment projects. The
choice between the two projects is assumed to be non-verifiable and thus
cannot be specified in the initial debt contract. One project is “specific” to
E in that it will take advantage of E’s unique skills; consequently, the
specific project will be more valuable when managed by E then when
managed by anyone else. In contrast, the “general” project will be one
with respect to which E will not have any advantage over other potential
managers.
9

On the possible consequences of these issues for behavior in bankruptcy, see RoseAckerman (1991).
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To be more specific, at time 1, E will face two projects. The value of the
firm’s project at time 2 depends on the realized state. For simplicity, we
assume two possible states: a bad state and a good state. We further
assume that the low value of the project is realized in the bad state, the
high value in the good state, and that that holds for both projects. None of
this is essential to the analysis, but these assumptions allow us to present
the model in streamlined fashion.
The probability of the bad state is p and of the good state 1-p. If the
general project is chosen and it succeeds—meaning the good state is
realized—it will have a value of G, independent of who manages the
project. If the general project is chosen and it fails—the bad state is
realized—it will have a value of B, again independent of who manages it.
In contrast, the value of the specific project depends on who manages it
and that fact is true both when the project succeeds and when it fails. If the
specific project succeeds, it has a value of S when E manages it and a value
of S - when it is managed by the best alternative manager. If the specific
project fails, it has a value of B in E’s hands and B - in the best alternative
hands. Note that if E manages the specific project, its value on failure is
the same as that of the general project, but nothing turns on this
assumption.
All of the values other than S—B, G, p,
and —are common
knowledge at time 0. S is a random variable having support [S1,S2], with
the density function f(.), and the cumulative density function F(.). We
assume that S1 < G and S2 > G. S is realized at time 1. The information
about the distribution of S is common knowledge.
To facilitate analysis, we assume that
B < D(1 + i0) and Min {G,S1}>

D(1+ i0 )
1− p

(1)

The first assumption ensures that a bad state of nature leads to
insolvency at time 2, regardless of which project is chosen. The second
assumption ensures that there is an interest rate i for which the debt can
be raised. Weaker assumptions would suffice, but again, these simplify the
analysis.10
To solve the model, we use backwards induction, commencing at T = 2.
At that date, all of the debt becomes due and the value of the project is
realized. If the value of the project at T = 2, W, is greater than D(1 + i), then
the firm will be “solvent.” The debtholders will get D(1 + i) and E will get
10

Note that if the assumptions embodied in equation (1) fail to hold, an extraction
regime may lower welfare by preventing funding of projects that should be funded.
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the balance, or W - D(1 + i). If the project has at T = 2 a value W lower than
D(1 + i), the firm will be insolvent and will go through insolvency
proceedings. We simply assume that insolvency proceedings ensue if the
firm cannot pay the debt and ignore the complicated issues associated
with initiating these proceedings.11
Our insolvency proceedings consist of two rules. The first rule
establishes how much value is available for distribution to E and the
lenders. The second rule divides that value among the firm’s claimants. As
to the first rule, we assume that the value available for division is that
which will come from a sale of the project at the end of the insolvency
proceedings. If the firm chooses the general project, B will be realized, as
the project does not require E’s unique skills. Any buyer will know that,
whether it hires E or any other manager, it will not need to pay more than
the competitive salary. Accordingly, with competition among buyers, the
price that will be obtained in the sale is B.
If the firm chose the specific project, however, a buyer that purchases
the project knows that it will have a project that is worth B with E’s unique
skills but only B - without these skills. Thus, the buyer expects that, once
it purchases the project, it will face a bilateral monopoly with E over ,
and that it can expect to split with E. Without loss of generality, we
assume that it is expected that the buyer and E will split evenly.12 In
sum, E can expect to be hired as a manager with a salary H higher than
the competitive salary. A buyer will attach a value of B - H , and, with
competition among buyers, this is the price that will be obtained in the
sale. Thus, if the general project is chosen and the firm fails, B will be
available for distribution; if the specific project is chosen and the firm fails,
B - H will be available.
The legal regimes differ in the way the available value is divided. We
contrast an absolute priority regime with an extraction regime. Under the
absolute priority regime, the value available is distributed per the
nonbankruptcy allocation: first to debtholders and then to equity, if the
debtholders are paid in full. Under the extraction regime, E is able to
extract some of the value available for distribution. That is, E has some
legal, procedural, etc. powers that enable it to extract some of this value.
11

On these issues, see Baird (1991) and Picker (1992).
The results of the paper will be the same for any division of the surplus
both sides get some positive amount.
12

in which
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Specifically, we assume that E can extract a fraction , 0 <
whatever is available for division.13

< H from

B. First Best Outcomes
To evaluate social welfare in our models, we focus on the ex ante value
of equity to the sole equityholder-manager. This is equivalent to the
question of whether efficiency in the sense of ex ante expected total value is
better served by the extraction regime or the absolute priority regime. The
questions are equivalent because in our model there is competition among
lenders to provide the initial debt and competition among buyers to buy
the firm’s project in the event of insolvency. Consequently, the riskneutral debtholders always get an expected return given by the risk-free
rate, and in the event of insolvency, the buyer does not make any profit.
Thus, the question of which regime will best give efficiency (and,
specifically, lead to more efficient project choice) is equivalent to the
question of which regime will maximize the ex ante expected value of
equity. Let V0 denote the ex ante value of E’s equity at T = 0. We will ask
whether V0 is higher with or without extraction.
Let V0* denote the first-best value for V0. E’s expected value is the
expected value of output minus the expected value of what the
debtholders will get. In a first-best world, E would choose the general
project if S < G, and the specific project if S ≥ G. This follows from that fact
that the value of the project in the bad state is independent of the choice of
project, but the value in the good state turns directly on which project is
chosen. The value in the good state therefore determines project choice.
The value of equity is just the expected value of the project given optimal
project choice at T = 1 less the required payment to the lenders:

[

[

]]

V0* = pB+ (1 − p ) Pr [S < G]G + Pr [S ≥ G]E S S ≥ G − D(1 + i0 )

(2)

Unfortunately, as we demonstrate below, this first-best result cannot
be obtained under either regime. The question of interest then becomes
whether one of the regimes does a better job of inducing the appropriate
choice of projects.
C. The Absolute Priority Regime
If E chooses the general project, E gets G - D(1 + i) if the project
succeeds and 0 if the project fails. E gets nothing if it fails, because E has
no unique skills for the general project and the applicable legal regime
13

Under the existing rules of chapter 11,
Chang (1992).

is likely to be less than H. See Bebchuk and
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confers no leverage on E. In contrast, if E chooses the specific project, if the
project succeeds, E gets S - D(1 + i). If the project fails, E gets H . This
represents E’s share of the upside from having E rather than a third party
manage the assets.
Thus, E will choose the specific project over the general project if

δ

(1− p)[S − D(1 + i )]+ p 2 ≥ (1− p)[G − D(1 + i )] (3)
Note that the left-hand-side is increasing in S, whereas the right-handside is independent of S. Thus, there is a threshold SAP, so that E will
choose the specific project if S ≥ SAP. SAP is that value of S for which the lefthand-side of (3) is equal to the right-hand-side. Manipulation of (3) results
in
p δ
S AP = G −
(4)
1− p 2
Taken together, these two equations suggest a “moral hazard”
problem. E may choose the specific project even if S < G so that its
expected value is lower than that of the general project. Given the fixed
payment to the lenders, E will prefer a specific project with S = G to the
general project. If the project fails, with the specific project E will still
capture H in light of E’s unique skills, whereas with the general project E
will not capture such value.
Having identified E’s project choice at T = 1, we can now turn to
identify the expected total value under the absolute priority regime, KAP:

[

[

K AP = pB+ (1 − p) Pr [S < SAP ]G + Pr[S ≥ SAP ]E S S ≥ SAP

with a corresponding value for equity of

[

]] (5)
]]

[

V0AP = pB+ (1 − p) Pr [S < S AP ]G + Pr [S ≥ SAP ]E S S ≥ SAP − D(1+ i0 )

(6)

Note that since SAP < G (see (4)), V0AP falls short of the first-best value
Vo* (see (2)). Specifically, V0AP is lower than Vo* by the difference:

(1− p)Pr[S

AP

[

< S < G]E G − SSAP < S < G

]

(7)

E is too inclined to choose the specific project over the general project.
The lender must be compensated for the cost that imposes. E would be
better off if E could precommit regarding the choice of project—that is, if
project choice were contractible.
D. The Extraction Regime
Next consider the extraction regime. As before, we focus on E’s choice
of project at T = 1 as a function of the realized value of S. If E chooses the
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general project and the project succeeds, E will get G - D(1 + i). If the
project fails, then the firm will be insolvent, the value for division will be
B, and, given the possibility of extraction, E will get B. In contrast, if E
chooses the specific project and the project succeeds, then E will get S - D(1
+ i). If the project fails, E will get two amounts. First, because the specific
project is more valuable if E manages it, E will get H to continue to
manage the project. E will also get (B - H ), the amount that E extracts
from the value divided among the participants.
Thus, E will choose the specific project if


(1− p) S − D(1+ i ) + p δ2 + β B− δ2   ≥ (1− p) G − D(1+ i) + pβB (8)

[

]

[

]

Reasoning about (8) in the same way we did about (3), we conclude
that E will choose the specific project if S is greater than or equal to the
threshold SE, where SE is defined by

SE = G −

p δ
(1− β)
1− p 2

(9)

Once again, we confront a “moral hazard” problem. So long as < 1—
that is, so long as E cannot extract all of the value to be distributed—E’s
decision is distorted in favor of the specific project. When the firm is
insolvent, E continues to do better with the specific project than with the
general project. But, as will be seen below, the distortion under the
extraction regime is less severe than under the absolute priority regime.
E
We now compute V0 the value of equity under the extraction regime,
at T = 0 given E’s decision rule at T = 1. It is given by:

[

]]

[

VE0 = pB+ (1 − p ) Pr[S < SE ]G + Pr [S ≥ SE ]E S S ≥ SE − D(1+ i0 )

(10)

Once again, this is simply the expected value of the project given E’s
decision rule, less the required expected payment to the lenders. As
before, since SE < G, the initial value of equity will fall short of the first-best
*
value Vo by the difference:

(1− p)Pr[S

E

[

] (11)

< S< G]E G − SSE < S< G

E. Comparing the Extraction and Absolute Priority Regimes
All of this allows us to compare the extraction and absolute priority
regimes. Comparing the r.h.s. of (4) with that of (9) allows us to establish
the following proposition:
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Proposition 1: The likelihood that the specific rather than general project
will be chosen is smaller under the extraction regime than under the
absolute priority regime: SE > SAP.
The intuition behind this result should be apparent. We have seen that
under both regimes there is some distortion in favor of the specific project.
For under both regimes, in the event of insolvency, E will be better off
with a specific project that depends critically on his unique skills than with
a general project. But the distortion is more severe under the absolute
priority regime than under the extraction regime. Under the extraction
regime, E can get something of the project’s value even if the project is the
general project. This reduces the benefit to E from choosing the specific
project and thereby weakens the distortion in favor of the specific project.
We can now compare the expected ex ante value under the two
regimes. Comparing (6) and (10) allows us to establish that:
Proposition 2: The expected project output and the initial equity value
are greater under the extraction regime than under the absolute priority
regime: KE > K AP and V E0 > V 0AP . The difference is:

(1− p)Pr[S

AP

[

< S< SE ]E G − SSAP < S< SE

]

(12)

As noted above, the question of expected output and initial value are
equivalent. In both cases, comparison of the regimes depends on the
decisions with respect to project choice induced by the regime. As we have
shown in the previous proposition, the distortion in favor of the specific
project is less severe under the extraction regime. From this follows the
conclusion that the extraction regime is superior from the perspectives of
both efficiency and E.
F. Implications for Managerial Turnover
In the model just presented, managers will be kept on, as their special
skills make them the best managers of the assets. This flies in the face of
the facts: studies under the Bankruptcy Act14 and the Bankruptcy Code15
confirm that managers of failed firms often lose their jobs. A more general
and more complete model would surely allow for the possibility that
hiring new managers is the better outcome. In such a model, it might be
possible to test the extraction analysis by investigating managerial
turnover. In the view of most legal observers, the 1978 change to the
14
15

See Ang and Chua (1981) and Schwartz and Menon (1985).
See Gilson (1989) and LoPucki and Whitford (1991). See also Gilson (1990).
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Bankruptcy Code enhanced the power of equityholders to extact value.16
The entrenchment model demonstrates that increasing the fraction
reserved for equity should lead to greater selection of general projects.
That in turn should increase the turnover of management of failed firms,
as the need to retain the old managers decreases. An increase in the extent
of the deviations from absolute priority would correlate with increased
management turnover in failed firms. If the changes in the federal
bankruptcy law in 1978 actually did further entrench managers, we would
expect to see an increase in management turnover. Unfortunately, the
available data is primarily for public firms and does not contrast pre- and
post-Code practices.17
II. Investment in Managerial Human Capital
A. Framework of Analysis
We now make certain changes in our assumptions in order to illustrate
how ex post extraction may affect ex ante investment in managerial
human capital. Whereas before we took E’s human capital as given, we
now make it the focus of our analysis. The main change that we make
concerns the decision made by E at T = 1. We now assume that there is one
project, so that no project choice decision is made. Instead, E chooses
whether to invest in human capital to enhance E’s ability to manage the
project. Specifically, if E invests an amount H, then the project will have
under E’s management (but not under someone else’s management) an
additional value of .
As before, the project has a probability of success of 1-p and of failure
of p. If E does not invest in human capital, the project has a value of C if it
16

The 1978 law may have made it easier for absolute priority to be violated. Under the
prior law, the rigid application of the “fair and equitable” test of Chapter X made it
difficult for senior classes to give value to lower classes consensually in the face of any
objecting class. See Treister, Trost, Forman, Klee and Levin (1988, p.411-13). The new
Chapter 11 provisions changed these rules to allow senior classes to agree to give value
to a lower class, even over the objection of a still junior class. Beyond this, the 1978
changes further strengthened the position of equityholders by giving them additional
control over the process. Appointing a Chapter 11 trustee became an extraordinary remedy, rather than than a required step, as took place under the old Chapter X.
17 The only empirical work to consider both deviations and turnover seems to be LoPucki
and Whitford (1990) and (1991). This work addresses the levels of deviations and
turnover after 1978 and therefore does not attempt to measure the change in these levels
between the pre- and post-Code periods.
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succeeds and B if it fails. We assume that B < D(1 + io); that is, if the project
fails, the firm is insolvent. We also assume that
C>

D (1 + i0)
1− p

(13)

This assumption ensures that there is an equilibrium interest rate at
which the debt D can be raised. (Weaker assumptions would suffice, but
we use this assumption for simplicity.)
If E does invest H in human capital, then at T = 2, if the project is
expected to continue to be managed by E, then the project will have a
value of C + if it succeeds, and a value of B + if it fails. The human
capital is non-transferable, so that if E does not subsequently manage the
project, then the project will have a value of only C (if successful) and B (if
it fails).
At T = 0, it’s known that E will have to make such a choice at T = 1. It’s
not known, however, what the efficient decision will be. Specifically, we
assume that is known in advance but that H, the cost of investment, is a
random variable. There is no private information about H and it is
common knowledge that H is distributed on the support [0,H ]with a
density function g(.) and a cumulative density function of G(.).
All the rest of our assumptions remain the same. In particular, we
retain the definitions of the two regimes—the extraction and the absolute
priority regimes—which can apply to the division of value at T = 2. If E
invests H, then we are at T = 2 in a situation in which the firm’s project is
specific. If E doesn’t invest H, then we’ll be at T = 2 in a situation as if the
firm’s project is general. Thus, we can expect that if E invests H, then the
surplus
will be realized whether the state of nature is favorable or
unfavorable. The efficient decision is for E to invest H if H < . If E could
be induced to make that choice, the first-best values of expected output
and the initial equity value would be obtained. As can be expected, neither
regime can obtain the first-best. But, as shown below, the extraction
regime does better than the absolute priority regime.
B. The Absolute Priority Regime
If E does not invest in human capital, then at T = 2 the firm will have a
general project. If the state of nature is unfavorable the firm will be
insolvent, and E will get nothing, but with probability (1-p), E will get C D(1 + i). If E invests in human capital, then if the firm becomes insolvent, E
will still get H (when hired by the buyer of the assets), and if the firm

Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial Entrenchment
ends up solvent E will get C +
capital if

15

- D(1 + i). Thus, E will invest in human

δ
− H + (1− p) C + δ − D(1 + i) + p ≥ (1− p) C − D(1 + i)
2

[

]

[

]

(14)

Proceeding in a way similar to that done with respect to (3) and (8), we
obtain that E will invest in human capital as long as H is lower than the
threshold HAP defined by
 p
H AP = δ 1−
 2

(15)

Equation (15) implies that there will be “underinvestment” in human
Hˆ > HAP, E will not
capital. If the realized value of H, Hˆ , is such that
invest in human capital even though, from a standpoint of overall
efficiency, E should do so. The reason for this is that E must bear the full
cost of the investment in human capital H, but E will not capture the full
benefit of the investment. If the firm becomes insolvent, E will split the
surplus with the buyer (and hence with the debtholders who will have
“control” over the assets which together with E’s human capital would be
necessary to produce the surplus ).
Thus, the expected value of equity under the absolute priority regime
will be

[

V0 = pB + (1 − p)C + Pr[H ≤ H AP ]E δ − H H ≤ H AP
AP

]

(16)

Both the expected value of the project KAP and the expected value of
equity V0AP will fall short of the first-best values by:

[

Pr[H AP < H < δ]E δ − H H AP < H < δ

]

(17)

C. The Extraction Regime
If E does not invest in human capital, E gets B if the project fails, C D(1+i) if it succeeds, for an expected payoff of

(1− p)[C − D(1+ i)]+ pβB (18)

If E does invest in human capital, E spends H and receives

δ
δ
(19)
+ β  B+

2
2
if the project fails and C +
payoff of

- D(1+i) if it succeeds, for an expected

δ

δ 
− H + (1− p) C + δ − D(1 + i) + p + β B + 

2 
2

[

]

(20)
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Thus, E will invest in human capital if equation (20) greater than or
equal to equation (18).
Reasoning in a way similar to that used before, we can conclude that E
will invest if H is lower than the threshold HE defined by
 p

H E = δ 1− (1− β )
 2


(21)

Once again, E will invest in human capital too infrequently. The value
of equity under the extraction regime will be:

[

]

V 0 = pB+ (1 − p)C + Pr[H ≤ HE ]E δ − H H ≤ H E − D(1 + i0 )
E

(22)

This is less than the first-best value by an amount equal to:

[

Pr[HE < H < δ]E δ − H HE < H < δ

]

(23)

D. Comparing the Absolute Priority and Extraction Regimes
Comparing the r.h.s. of (15) with that in (21) we get the following
proposition:
Proposition 3: The likelihood that E will make the investment in human
capital is greater under the extraction regime than under the absolute
priority regime: HE > HAP.
This result makes intuitive sense. The distortion against investing in
human capital results from the fact that under both regimes, while E must
bear all the costs of the investment, E captures only a fraction of the
benefits produced by the investment. Under the extraction regime,
however, E can expect to capture a greater fraction of the benefits
produced by E’s investment. For under the extraction regime E will get a
fraction of the value produced by selling the firm’s assets, and E’s
investment in human capital will increase the value of these assets.
Let us now turn to comparing the expected total value and the
expected value of E’s position under both regimes. Comparing (16) with
(22), we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 4: The expected total value and the expected value of E’s
position are greater under the extraction regime than under the absolute
E
AP
priority regime: KE > KAP and V 0 > V 0 . The difference is given by:

[

Pr[H AP < H < HE ]E δ − H H AP < H < HE

]

(24)

As we have noted, the question of which regime produces a higher
expected total value is equivalent to the question of which regime
produces a higher expected value for E. Both questions depend on how
the regimes compare in providing incentives for E’s making efficient
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decisions with respect to investment in human capital. As we have seen in
the previous proposition, the distortion against investing in human capital
is more severe under the absolute priority regime. From this follows the
conclusion that the extraction regime is superior from the perspective of
both efficiency (total value) and the shareholder-manager E.
E. Implications for Managerial Turnover
The human capital model also speaks to managerial turnover. More
extraction leads to greater investment in human capital, meaning more
specificity. More managers should be rehired and turnover should be
reduced. Larger deviations from absolute priority would correlate with
reduced management turnover in bankruptcy. These effects, of course,
run directly contrary to the effects found in the managerial entrenchment
model. In that model, increasing the fraction reserved for equity should
lead to greater selection of general projects, which in turn should increase
the turnover of management of failed firms, as the need to retain the old
managers decreases. Unfortunately, our two effects work in opposite
directions and it would take some work to disentangle them. We would
first have to determine whether there was indeed a regime shift when the
federal bankruptcy law was reworked in 1978. Assuming we could do
that, an appropriate data set on turnover should let us determine whether
the entrenchment effect or the human capital effect is the more powerful.
IV.

Conclusion

Much of the current criticism of Chapter 11 focuses, naturally enough,
on the social losses that result from fights over how to divide the pie when
the firm fails. This criticism evaluates bankruptcy rules by looking at
outcomes for failed firms. The fact that bankruptcy often is the end-of-theline makes it particularly natural to use an ex post perspective to evaluate
bankruptcy rules. As others have begun to realize, though, it is a mistake
to focus only on how the failure rules influence the end-of-game play.
That static point-in-time view should instead be replaced by a dynamic
view that also addresses the decisionmaking at the time of initial project
selection and on the eve of bankruptcy.
This paper has sought to contribute to our understanding of the ex
ante effects of bankruptcy rules that enable extraction and violations of
absolute priority. In particular, it has shown that such rules have a
beneficial effect on those decisions that determine the extent to which
corporate assets are manager-specific. First, we have shown that extraction
reduces the incentive of managers to choose projects tailored to their
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existing human capital. In an absolute priority regime, managers will
embrace such specific projects and will reject superior general projects,
thereby reducing overall welfare. The extraction regime tempers those
incentives and thereby improves overall welfare. Second, we have shown
that an extraction regime encourages investment in firm-specific human
capital and moves such investments closer to the efficient level. Again, this
increases social welfare over that obtainable under an absolute priority
regime. Of course, these two effects of the legal regime are only one part
of the many relevant effects, so we cannot conclude that the extraction
regime is superior to the absolute priority regime.18
We have focused our analysis on the closely-held corporation.
Nonetheless, we think the same issues will arise for publicly-held
corporations. If project choice and investment in human capital are not
observable and verifiable—and thus not contractible—then the problems
we identified also arise in a company with a separation of management
and ownership. Given the problems in contracting, we will again have too
much investment in specific assets and too little investment in human
capital. Thus, a regime in which the managers—now as distinct from the
equityholders—can get some of the value emerging out of bankruptcy
proceedings may improve the investment decisions for the same reasons
seen in our analysis of the closely-held corporation. Note that what is
important in the case of the public corporation is that the managers get
such a fraction, either through their stockholdings or otherwise. But to
understand this issue fully, we would need to explore the contracting
problem between managers, equityholders and debtholders and would
have to establish empirically the effect of the existing bankruptcy rules on
the fraction of value captured by managers. These are issues for another
day.
18

Note also that our analysis does no more than suggest that a deviation from absolute
priority might be useful. But even if such deviations are desirable, this does not imply
that they should be produced by the mandatory rules of the Bankruptcy Code. Creditors
could contract directly with manager-shareholders to create “bankruptcy parachutes”
that would provide them with some value even when the creditors were not paid in full.
In fact, the standard justification for golden parachutes in the takeover context focuses on
an effect that is similar to the beneficial effects that we have identified as arising from the
extraction regime. See Harris (1990).
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